I’d very much like to attend this lecture. Unfortunately, I live in Oslo now, and have class mondays and tuesdays, and start to work thursdays and fridays in september.

Will you be at the lecture yourself? Do you think it’ll be possible to film it, and put it on google video or something? :D

No prob.

Thanks a lot, Zahg!

Isn’t this right up your alley(?):

http://org.ntnu.no/apeiron/

“17.09 Is Virtual Reality an Oxymoron? Epistemological, ontological and ethical issues raised by virtuality.
Johnny Hartz Søraker, PhD Research Fellow ved Universitetet i Twente

At first glance, the concept ‘virtual reality’ seems to be an oxymoron. If it even makes sense to characterise something as ‘almost real’, what are the implications for the ontological and epistemological status of virtual entities and why should we bother with the ethics of illusory experiences? In this lecture I will give a broad, horizontal sweep of the philosophical issues raised by virtuality in different forms. A general purpose will be to show how virtuality re-actualizes and re-shapes many traditional philosophical issues (I will focus on Plato, Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, Hume and Kant). In particular, I will argue that virtual reality is indeed an apt term; while virtual reality clearly differs from actual (physical) reality, it also differs from mere products of the mind in a manner that has profound implications for its ontology, epistemology and ethics.”

I like to use this as an analogy for how I see the truth issue: From absolute doubt as the initial condition, one can run “iterations of faith” to make a world appear:

No iterations of faith and everything must be doubted. Literally everything. If absolute truth is all one will accept, then one will be left in absolute darkness.

A few iterations of faith and Hume’s fork appears: One can trust logic and math, but no empirical statements.

With more iterations of faith one may allow oneself to start taking some results of science for granted.

With a whole lot of iterations of faith, even contradictory things are believed. Magical thinking isn’t censored by one’s subconscious mind any more.

At all levels there are valuable insights. At the scientific level of faith iterations, we can find communicable general statements that are very precise in prediction. But it is at the magical level of faith iterations that we find the richest aesthetic experiences (this is not just pointless fun, it’s also inspiring in the useful sense). What I want is to have a theory that makes it possible for me to navigate up and down the levels of faith iterations without doing any of the classic mistakes, like hypostatizing hallucinations or ideas, or allowing magical thinking to interfere with my philosophy studies. I think a theoretical framework or “operating system” is needed to make this possible.

I’m presently working on a post about Mike and his relationshop with Kant, so I’ll skip replying to that bit.

I sure agree that it is “only through the lens of our mental apparatus do we experience at all”.

The apparatus has no intention of trying to create a model of the “real world”. It’s only purpose was to help us survive. It’s main feature is it’s ability to create models. You can enhance and enrich this process by mental activities (study hard!) - even physical activities (run or dance!) - even by phychoactive drugs (like in Shamanism). It does not take much to change the models or appearances of the apparatus. Actually - if you do nothing - the apparatus will create models by itself! It is a model-making machine.

But this is not to say that we know nothing about the reality “behind and beyond”.
That is the domain of science.

Now - if your interest is in “model-making” - that is a totally other ballgame.

By the way - I think Mike is saying the opposite of Kant, where you quote Kant in saying: “objects are made possible by representation rather than the other way around”.
To me is seems like Mike is moving all the focus to the “representation” - or his “subjective experience”.

Mike is really there, but his physical appearance to me (or anyone else, or himself) is not an ontologically true description.

I see him as a face; biology tells me that a more accurate description is that he’s a huge compilation of coöperating cells; physics takes this to the extreme, and claims that he somehow can be reduced to quarks and leptons. Which one of these models or appearances is true? None of them.

There really is a true reality behind or beyond all of these appearances, but we can’t experience this true reality. Only through the lense of our mental apparatus do we experience at all. Thus, as Kant would say, “objects are made possible by representation rather than the other way around”.